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Abstract 
Restricting application rates is an attractive way for funders to reduce time and money wasted 
evaluating uncompetitive applications. However, mathematical models show that this could 
induce chaotic cycles in total application numbers, increasing uncertainty in the funding 
process. One emergent property is that smaller institutions spend disproportionally more time 





Funders are under pressure to reduce numbers of grant applications 
Increasing the efficiency of resource allocation is a significant priority for funders and research 
organisations. Time and effort spent writing, processing and reviewing unsuccessful 
applications is largely wasted, since, in contrast with the publications process in which most 
rejected papers are eventually published, rejected grants are usually never funded. As success 
rates are often only 10% or even lower, and rarely as high as 30%, the resources lost to 
unsuccessful applications are considerable.   
Low success rates are undoubtedly not in the interests of research funders, researchers 
or universities and research institutes. Funders have led the responses to this, primarily by 
introducing systems to restrict the numbers of applications that they receive. Individuals, or 
institutions, with poor success rates are subject to application limits, notionally encouraging 
them to increase application quality.  Based on an analysis of the trade-off between success 
and effort, a target success rate of 20% is thought to be optimal [1]. 
Investigating the effects of application caps   
One such system (termed demand managementZDVUHFHQWO\LQWURGXFHGE\WKH8.¶V1DWXUDO
Environment Research Council (NERC) in response to long-term declines in its success rates.  
Institutions that are unsuccessful (average success rate of <20%) over the medium term (3 
years) are penalised by capping the maximum number of applications they are permitted to 
submit. The intention is to achieve a success rate of 20% overalli. The specific rules for this 
system are included in the supplementary text (Models of NERC demand management).   
From a mathematical perspective, the grant application process can be regarded as a 
discrete-time dynamical system. When control measures are introduced in such systems, for 
example by introducing application caps, is known to induce chaotic behaviour [2, 3]. Indeed, 
we find such behaviour in deterministic and stochastic models of the NERC demand 
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management system (see supplemental text, Models of NERC demand management). Figure 1 
shows the behaviour of an ensemble of institutions chosen to reflect key characteristics of the 
distribution of applications typically received by NERC (see supplemental data file, 
NERC_DATA.csvii).  
The deterministic system (Figure 1a) displays extreme 4-year cycles with a positive 
Lyapunov exponent (estimated numerically, see Wolf and colleagues [4]), a characteristic of 
chaotic behaviour. The attractor from which these chaotic cycles arise is shown in Figure 1c. 
While this cyclic behaviour becomes much less pronounced in the stochastic system (Figure 
1b), it remains statistically detectable demonstrating that the underlying dynamics remain the 
same in both models. Thus, these models show that, even if chance is removed from the grant 
award process, the application dynamics arising from the demand management system will 
remain inherently unpredictable.  
Under these conditions, the success rate achieved does not reach the target of 20%. This 
is because uncapped institutions are permitted to submit as many applications as they wish. 
Moreover, at the level of an individual institution we find that the dynamics of the system 
exhibit scale dependence (Figure 2). There are qualitative differences for small, medium and 
large-sized institutions in the likelihood of being subject to, and the effect of, demand 
management (Figure 2a ± c). Institutions subject to the minimum cap are likely to spend a 
protracted period in this state. For this reason, smaller institutions, which have an application 
capacity closer to this minimum, are more likely to be subject to demand management than 
larger ones (Figures 2d & e). The only exception to this is when success rates are very low. 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2f, in demand management the success rate of small institutions 
drops substantially, while those of medium and large institutions are almost unaffected.  
Implications for funders, research institutions, and individual researchers 
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Our analysis highlights three key features of systems which impose limits on application 
numbers: 
(i) Such limits can impose disproportionate disadvantages on specific subgroups of the 
academic community. In this specific case, organisations face a significant potential 
handicap if they are small or medium sized even though their applications are of 
the same quality as those of larger institutions. 
(ii) Specific target success rates cannot be attained simply by limiting applications from 
individuals or institutions with low success rates. Instead interventions which 
encourage all applicants to modify their behaviour are required. In particular, unless 
all institutions take steps to reduce the numbers of applications they submit, NERC 
demand management will generate significant variability in application numbers 
(and thus success rates).   
(iii) Reducing the number of applications made is the only way to attain long-term target 
success rates. Increasing the quality of applications is insufficient, since if all 
applications were to improve it would still be impossible to fund them all, thus the 
only outcome would be an increase in unfunded excellence.   
Unfortunately, declining success rates across funders suggest that there is a much 
greater pool of applicants than there is financial resource to support them [5-7]. In the very 
long-term that means two, non-exclusive, outcomes. We emphasise that these are an inevitable 
consequence of limited funds, but restrictions on applications will potentially create additional 
stresses.  First, many groups will be unfunded for long periods and this will lead to a slow 
degradation in outputs and capability in the absence of other funding. As we argue above, this 
is particularly likely to apply to groups within small and medium sized institutions.  Second, 
universities and research institutions may become wary of investing strategic support into areas 
supported by funding bodies which introduce such restrictions, if applications to them are 
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regarded as risky. This would lead to a reduction in capability, particularly in small and medium 
sized institutions, exaggerating the existing inequalities in the system [8].  
 The final issue to raise is that, when applications are restricted on the institutional level, 
the most important strategic imperative for an institution subject to such restrictions is to 
increase success rates. In the long-term this is for the benefit of the whole institution as it will 
permit all researchers to submit grants when they wish. However the best short-term 
mechanism for achieving this is obviously to only submit grants which are deemed to have the 
KLJKHVWFKDQFHRIVXFFHVV7KLVVWUDWHJ\RIµEDFNLQJZLQQHUV¶ UXQVD ULVNRIGLVDGYDQWDJLQJ
junior staff in favour of established stars thus exacerbating the existing demographic biases 
(e.g. age, sex and race) present within academia. Additionally, the most innovative proposals, 
which have the greatest transformative potential, may be discouraged as they are typically more 
risky than incremental projects building on existing work. These effects are potentially difficult 
to measure. For example, NERC reports that there has been no fall in awards to new 
investigators since demand management was introducedi. However, they note that applications 
from new investigators have decreased substantially and that, according to feedback from 
institutions, new investigator status has been considered when determining which applications 
to submit.  
Are application caps the best solution to the problem? 
Although the bottom line is that in a resource limited world we cannot support everything, we 
believe that our analysis reveals that there are possible unintended consequences of application 
caps that will impact on both individual researchers and the whole research field. Our model 
suggests that some of these negative effects might be mitigated by small changes to the systems 
used. For example, increasing the minimum application cap from one grant to two in the 
demand management system (see supplemental figure S1) substantially increases the success 
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rates of small institutions in demand management although they still spend more time in this 
state. Similarly, the potential bias against newer staff might be mitigated by not counting 
applications from such staff against the institutional cap, although we note that our model does 
not specifically address this issue.  
Imposing individual sanctions on applications, whether on institutions or individuals, 
is likely to induce periodic variation in the overall number of applications received; as cycles 
of low application pressure allow restrictions to be lifted with a subsequent spike in application 
numbers. Introducing a cap on the total number of applications would address this variability, 
but, if application opportunities are allocated on the basis of past success, runs the risk of 
creating a positive feedback loop favouring the creation of a single dominant institution.  
Of course, imposing restrictions is not the only way to address the inefficiencies of the 
funding process. The radical reimagining proposed by Bollen and colleagues [5], combining a 
universal basic research income with researcher-led redistribution of funds, would eliminate 
the grant application process, and thus its inherent waste, completely. However, there is little 
evidence that funders are seriously considering this approach as yet [6]. More practically, the 
National Science Foundation has achieved a reduction in application numbers in some of its 
schemes by relaxing, rather than increasing, restrictions on grant applications [7]. By moving 
to a continuous funding model, eliminating grant application deadlines, their scheme appears 
to reduce pressure to submit an application at every opportunity and to encourage applicants to 
spend more time refining their proposals. Given the inherent limitations of attempting to restrict 
application numbers that we have demonstrated, we suggest that funders should consider  more 
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Figure 1: Demand management results in chaotic grant application cycles. Typical 
trajectories of overall application numbers are plotted for (a) deterministic and (b) stochastic 
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models of the grant application and award process. The mean number of applications per 
annum, their standard deviation, and the overall success rate are given for each model. These 
trajectories display a characteristic four year cycle, the Lyapunov exponent of which was 
estimated for the trajectory arising from the deterministic model. The attractor for this cycle is 
visualised (c) in terms of the frequency of orbits through a particular volume of phase space. 
This attractor divides into two states, high application cycles and low application cycles, of 
different frequencies (see inset labels).     
Figure 2: The effect of demand management varies disproportionately with institution 
size. Typical application dynamics, arising from the stochastic model, are plotted for each of 
the three institution sizes: (aODUJHȜ bPHGLXPȜ DQGcVPDOOȜ <HDUV
in which an institution is subject to demand management (DM) are indicated by a red circle. 
Three summary measures of the effect of demand management: (d) the time spent in demand 
management; (e) the length of a period in demand management; and (f) the success rate of an 
institution dependent on its demand management state, were calculated for three overall 
success rates, see legend. Overall success rate was controlled by decreasing the application rate 
for each institution size by a common factor. Note that the length of periods in demand 
management are approximately exponentially distributed, and that, as such, the mean is used 
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